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Abstract—Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) is a crypto-
graphic scheme that provides Trusted Platform Module (TPM)-
backed anonymous credentials. We develop TAMARIN modelling
of the ECC-based version of the protocol as it is standardised
and provide the first mechanised analysis of this standard. Our
analysis confirms that the scheme is secure when all TPMs are
assumed honest, but reveals a break in the protocol’s expected
authentication and secrecy properties for all TPMs even if only
one is compromised. We propose and formally verify a minimal
fix to the standard. In addition to developing the first formal
analysis of ECC-DAA, the paper contributes to the growing body
of work demonstrating the use of formal tools in supporting
standardisation processes for cryptographic protocols.
Index Terms—Direct Anonymous Attestation, symbolic verifi-
cation, TAMARIN PROVER, authentication, secrecy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Devices such as laptops, smartphones and tablets, which
connect to the Internet, are commonplace. Trusted computing
is one approach that enhances the security on these devices
by installing a “root of trust” (RoT), e.g., through a Trusted
Platform Module (TPM) [1], [2], ARM TrustZone Trusted
Execution Environment [3], Intel Software Guard Extensions
(SGX) [4], etc. These roots of trust are then used to attest that
devices are in a “trustworthy” state, meaning that the devices
behave as expected for a specific purpose. It is desirable that
such device attestations be conducted in a privacy-preserving
manner to protect users, and reduce the knowledge adversaries
may learn. Two popular anonymous attestation schemes are
Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) [5] for the TPM, and
Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID) [6] for Intel’s SGX. In this paper
we focus on TPMs.
A TPM is a resource-constrained cryptographic co- processor
which is embedded within a commodity device which we
refer to as the host. The TPM supports (i) isolation: separate
and protected from the host in the event of compromise; (ii)
protected execution: ensures the operation is executed and not
interfered with; and (iii) secure storage: storage which is only
accessible by the TPM if the host is in a trustworthy state. The
Trusted Computing Group (TCG) reports there are billions of
TPMs installed in branded PCs, laptops and servers [7].
DAA is an anonymous digital signature scheme which
provides authentication and privacy, to ensure the integrity
of devices. There are two variants of a DAA scheme built from
public-key cryptosystems, the RSA-DAA and the Elliptic Curve
based ECC-DAA scheme respectively [8], [9], [10]. The ECC-
DAA variant is more efficient for low-end resource constrained
devices [10] which is appropriate for hardware RoTs.
ISO/IEC 20008-2:2013 [11] is implemented and deployed
widely today within TPMs, more specifically, including three
DAA related mechanisms: Mechanism 2 is an RSA-DAA scheme,
which is implemented in the TPM 1.2 specification Mechanism
3 is the EPID scheme, which does not split the TPM and host
operations, and which in the literature is called pre-DAA
and Mechanism 4, the focus of this work, is an ECC-DAA
scheme, which is implemented in early versions of the TPM
2.0 specification. The TPM API of ECC-DAA in the TPM 2.0
specification is designed to support two ECC-DAA schemes:
Mechanism 4 and a modification of Mechanism 3 with the
splitting operations. ISO/IEC 20008-2:2013 Mechanism 4 relies
on the use of a “secure and authentic channel” but leaves such
a mechanism out of scope. The standard refers to Chen et
al. [10] to provide an appropriate mechanism. Throughout this
paper we refer to the combination of ISO/IEC 20008-2:2013
Mechanism 4 and the recommended ways of implementing a
secure and authentic channel as I-MECH4.
Brickell et al. [12] state that an ECC-DAA scheme must
satisfy the notions of correctness, user-controlled anonymity
and user-controlled traceability. Intuitively these correctness,
security and privacy properties mean the following:
• Correctness: valid signatures are verifiable and linkable,
when needed;
• User-controlled anonymity: the identity of a device cannot
be revealed from the signature;
• User-controlled traceability: the host controls whether
signatures can be linked.
The ISO/IEC standard directly cites Brickell et al. [12] as the
reference for the scheme’s security and privacy properties.
There have been substantial efforts from the academic
community in the development of proofs analysing ECC-
DAA, including simulation [5], game-based [13] and more
recently within the UC-model [14]. The formal methods tool
PROVERIF [15] has been used to analyse symbolic abstractions
of DAA [16], [17], [18], [19]. These symbolic analysis efforts
have not covered the host and TPM being split roles. All of
these endeavours have helped to both find weaknesses in DAA
and guide the design decisions of future releases of DAA [20].
A. Contributions
Our contribution in the paper is a complete, terminating
and provable symbolic model for the suite of ECC-DAA op-
erations with proofs of the security and privacy properties
analysed using the TAMARIN PROVER (TAMARIN) [21]. We
present a symbolic verification of the ISO/IEC 20008-2:2013
Mechanism 4, which is implemented in TPM 2.0. The analysis
performed covers all operations of the ECC-DAA scheme:
SETUP, JOIN, SIGN, VERIFY and LINK. Our main contributions
in this work are as follows:
1) We develop a symbolic model of I-MECH4. We model the
TPM and the host as two separate actors that communicate
over a secure channel. Note that our model does not restrict
the number of TPMs or hosts. The split of the hosts and
TPMs is consistent with recent computational proofs. The
roles of the hosts and TPMs are clearly separated and the
communication between the roles is not under the control
of an adversary, thus requiring the use of a secure channel.
We provide a faithful abstraction of the operations of ECC-
DAA which includes a representation of splitting an host
and a TPM that is not covered by previous work.
2) We have defined a method for performing symbolic non-
interactive zero-knowledge proofs for ECC-DAA within
TAMARIN. We provide the first concrete example of zero-
knowledge proofs in TAMARIN that did not require any
modifications or additions to the tool. The formal model
can be used in other protocol analysis containing zero-
knowledge proofs.
3) This is the first symbolic model to prove all security and
privacy properties of I-MECH4. Our analysis revealed a
man-in-the-middle attack such that the compromise of a
single TPM means that no other TPM can be authenticated
reliably, and secrecy cannot be guaranteed. We proposed
a solution for I-MECH4 based on the privacy CA protocol
by Chen et al. [22], [23], and this provably fixes the attack
found.
4) We present a clear mapping and encoding of I-MECH4
and its associated properties in a corresponding TAMARIN
model. Our model is annotated against the standards
document, which provides an easy way to validate that
the formal model is a faithful representation of the
standardised scheme. It also provides a foundational
formal model for future symbolic ECC-DAA analysis within
TAMARIN.
We provide all the artefacts needed to reproduce our results
in [24].
B. Related Symbolic Analysis Work
Our work significantly goes beyond the state-of-the-art
symbolic analysis of DAA schemes in the literature. Previous
symbolic analysis work by Backes et al. [16] introduced a
framework in the applied pi calculus, for the reasoning and anal-
ysis of non-interactive zero-knowledge within the PROVERIF
tool. Preliminary analysis of the RSA-DAA operations was used
as a case study for their framework. The analysis revealed a
weakness in the JOIN operation showing that if a TPM A was
compromised and its endorsement key leaked then an adversary
could perform a JOIN impersonating A. This attack was then
fixed in the operation by including a TPMs identity in the zero-
knowledge proof. Additional analysis of RSA-DAA anonymity
in SIGN was performed, and showed that two DAA signatures
were indistinguishable. Work by Backes et al. analysed the
initial proposal by Brickell, Camenisch and Chen in [5] and
pre-dates the standardisation of RSA-DAA in ISO/IEC 20008-2
2013 Mechanism 2. They do not consider a secure and authentic
channel. In this paper we find a similar attack even though our
model follows the recommended way of building a secure and
authentic channel.
Smyth et al. in [17] found a vulnerability of the RSA-
DAA scheme where user privacy could be violated in the
presence of a corrupt ISSUER and VERIFIER which collude. They
demonstrated that if a VERIFIER uses the same linking property
(basename) as the ISSUER, then the identity of a PLATFORM
can be revealed. An ISSUER could also be a VERIFIER and it is
not unreasonable that this single entity would have the same
basename in both operations. This is possible due to the way
in which the basename is computed, e.g., hash(bsn) for both
JOIN and SIGN. The privacy violation is fixed by making a
minor alteration to the RSA-DAA scheme which introduces a 0
or 1 bit in the computation of basename, e.g., hash(0 ‖ bsn),
for the operations JOIN and SIGN respectively thus preserving
untraceability. Again this work pre-dates the standardisation of
DAA in ISO/IEC 20008-2 2013, and the model was developed
using the initial standard defined by the TCG in version 1.2
revision 85 [25] in 2005.
Additional research on the ECC-DAA scheme by Smyth et al.
was presented in [18]. It is important to note that their model
does not provide a full abstraction of the scheme, because the
JOIN operation is omitted. Additionally, in the SIGN operation
the adversary was forbidden from re-blinding signatures which
limits the adversary ability. The authors analysed the user-
controlled anonymity property of ECC-DAA using observational
equivalence and this was shown to hold. However, no general
conclusions regarding anonymity could be made due to the
level of abstraction of the model. The authors state that the
focus of their work was on the ISO/IEC 20008-2:2011 draft
standard.
While a number of different symbolic modelling tools exist
including TAMARIN and PROVERIF, we chose TAMARIN to
model ECC-DAA due to the class of protocols it has successfully
been able to analyse including TLS 1.3, eVoting, public-key
infrastructure and future Intelligent Transportation Systems
[26], [27], [28], [29].
C. Paper Organisation
The paper is organised as follows. In Section II we describe
the ECC-DAA scheme, its suite of protocols and the security
and privacy properties claimed by Brickell et al. in [12].
Section III describes an overview of the fundamentals of the
TAMARIN PROVER and our TAMARIN model. In Section IV, we
describe our threat model and formalise the security and privacy
guarantees. Section V describe our results and Section VI
provides conclusions and future work.
II. ECC-BASED DIRECT ANONYMOUS ATTESTATION
In this section we provide a concise description of the
ECC-DAA scheme’s operations, as defined in ISO/IEC 20008-
2:2013 [11], necessary for understanding our symbolic model.
Direct Anonymous Attestation [5] is an authentication
mechanism that enables the provision of privacy-preserving
and accountable authentication services. ECC-DAA is based on
group signatures that give strong anonymity guarantees, unlike
traditional digital signature mechanisms [30], [31], [32] that
are used to provide entity authentication, non-repudiation and
data integrity.
Traditional digital signature mechanisms enable the holder(s)
of a private key to generate a digital signature for a message.
The related verification key (public key) is then used to verify
the validity of a signed message. In contrast, an anonymous
digital signature mechanism is a special class of a digital
signature where no (authorised or unauthorised) entity can
discover the identity of the user who signed the message.
As with traditional digital signature mechanisms, anonymous
digital signature mechanisms are based on asymmetric cryp-
tography. The difference between traditional digital signature
mechanisms and anonymous digital signatures is that to verify
an anonymous signature a user makes use of a group public
key (group signature) or multiple public keys (ring signature),
neither of which is bound to an individual user.
The ECC-DAA scheme is an anonymous digital signature
mechanism, and the motivation for applying ECC-DAA is the
ability to split the signer role between a secure device (TPM),
and a commodity computing device (host). In ISO/IEC 20008-
2:2013 mechanism 4 a TPM is referred to as a principal signer
and a host is referred to as an assistant signer. Throughout
the paper a principal signer is referred to as PSIGNER and
an assistant signer as ASIGNER. Essentially, a PSIGNER can
sign any arbitrary message collaboratively with an ASIGNER
which is the commodity device. This split utilises the high
level of security offered by a PSIGNER, in conjunction with
the computational ability and storage capacity offered by an
ASIGNER (see [10] for a practical example).
An ECC-DAA scheme considers a set of entities: ISSUERs,
ASIGNERs, PSIGNERs, and VERIFIERs; the ASIGNER and PSIGNER
together form a trusted PLATFORM. The ISSUER is a trusted
third-party responsible for attesting and authorising PLATFORMs
to join the network of PLATFORMs. A VERIFIER is any other
system entity or trusted third-party that can verify a PLATFORM’s
credentials in a privacy-preserving manner using ECC-DAA
operations; without the need of knowing a PLATFORM’s identity.
The ECC-DAA scheme is a two phase process with five
operations. Phase one consists of SETUP and JOIN while phase
two uses SIGN, VERIFY and LINK. The interactions between
entities involved in the JOIN, SIGN and VERIFY operations are
shown in Figure 1. The DAA notation followed in this paper
are as presented in the ISO/IEC 20008-2:2013 [11] document.
Briefly, [x]P is a multiplication operator that takes a positive
integer x and a point P on an elliptic curve. The ’+’ operator
represents addition, ’−’ operator is subtraction, and ’‖’ operator
is the concatenation of two data items.
We next describe each of the ECC-DAA operations in turn.
SETUP: The SETUP operation initialises the system with the
security parameters (Ki, P1), for each of the operations and
long-term parameters of the ISSUER, and these parameters are
published to all entities. Prior to this operation, we assume
during the manufacture time of a PSIGNER, an endorsement
key-pair (skekps / pkekps ) is embedded by the manufacturer in
read-only memory (ROM) and ISSUERs have access to public
endorsement keys. Furthermore, a unique internal secret value
DAASeed is set, and a monotonic counter (cnt) is implemented
on the PSIGNER, and an external counter is available to the
ASIGNER. The ISSUER also generates its ECC-DAA key-pair (skI
/ pkI ), and publishes its public key.
JOIN: This operation of the ECC-DAA scheme is run between
a PLATFORM (the ASIGNER and PSIGNER) and an ISSUER. The
JOIN operation executes as shown in Figure 1a and upon
successful completion attests a PLATFORM as being a genuine
member of the group, and the PLATFORM receives a credential
(cre) from the ISSUER for use in future communications with
VERIFIERs. The cre attests that the PSIGNER is valid, and the
PSIGNER computes the D element of cre containing the ECC-
DAA secret key tsk. The communication is conducted over a
public channel between the ISSUER and an ASIGNER. The TCG
recommends that encryption is applied to this communication
using the TPM endorsement keys [33].
SIGN / VERIFY: The SIGN operation is run between a given
PSIGNER and its associated ASIGNER when a VERIFIER sends
a message to be signed to the ASIGNER. The VERIFIER then
performs the subsequent VERIFY operation. Other VERIFIERs in
the group can also verify a signed message. Figure 1b describes
the various steps of the SIGN and VERIFY operations, and the
interaction between entities.
An ASIGNER initiates the SIGN operation when it receives
a message, nV , from a VERIFIER. The ASIGNER SIGN step of
the operation constructs one portion of the ECC-DAA signature
which includes randomising the ASIGNER’s credentials cre
yielding R, S, T and W . The VERIFIER basename bsn, which
is either a fixed string value associated with the VERIFIER or
not specified (denoted by the special symbol ⊥), determines
whether J is a randomly selected group element or fixed as
H1(bsn). The latter case is used when signatures are required
to be linkable. The ASIGNER sends its part of the ECC-DAA
signature to the PSIGNER which then uses these values to
construct a proof of knowledge of its secret key tsk which
it returns to the ASIGNER. The ASIGNER completes the SIGN
operation, by incorporating the various computed values into
the signature σ, which the VERIFIER can now use to verify
that the message has been signed by a PLATFORM that is a
member of the group. These proofs convince a VERIFIER that
a message is signed by a ECC-DAA key that was certified by
the ISSUER, without knowledge of the PSIGNER’s ECC-DAA key
or cre (VERIFY). Of course, the VERIFIER has to trust that the
ISSUER only issues cres to valid PSIGNERs.
PSigner
skekps , pkI
ASigner
pkI
Issuer
pkekps , skI
Issuer Join One
Fresh
km, nI .
{|km, nI |}pkekps{|km, nI |}pkekps
PS Join One
tsk←PRF (DAASeed||KI ||cnt)
Decrypt message
to recover km and nI
Fresh u, Compute:
Q2← [tsk]P1; U ← [u]P1
v ← H2(P1||Q2||U ||pkI ||nI)
w ← u+ [v]tsk
γ ←MAC(Q2, v, w)km
Q2, v, w, γ Q2, v, w, γ
Issuer Join Two
verifyMAC(m,γ, km) = accept
Compute
U ′ ← [w]P1− [v]Q2;
v′ ← H2(P1||Q2||U
′||pkI ||nI)
if v′ 6= v then abort
Fresh r
Generate creI ←< A,B,C >
A← [r]P1; B ← [skI ]A
C ← [skI ]A+ [rskI ]Q2
{|creI |}pkekps{|creI |}pkekps
PS Join Two
Decrypt message to recover creI
Compute D ← [tsk]B
cre←< A,B,C,D >
cre
AS Join Four
verifyCre(A,B,C,D, pkI) = accept
store cre
aliveness
(a) JOIN operation
PSigner
tsk
ASigner
cre, pkI , bsn
Verifier
bsn, pkI
Verifier Sign One
Fresh nV , m
nV , m
ASigner Sign One
Fresh l
Randomise ĉre ← <R, S, T, W>
R← [l]A; S ← [l]B
T ← [l]C; W ← [l]D
Compute
c← H3(R,S, T,W, nV )
if bsn = ⊥ then
Fresh J
else J ← H1(bsn)
c, J, S,m, bsn
PSigner Sign One
Compute
K ← [tsk]J
Fresh nT , r
Compute
R1 ← [r]J ; R2 ← [r]S
h←
H4(c||m||J ||K||bsn||R1||R2||nT )
s← compute_s(r, tsk)
K, h, s, nT
ASigner Sign Two
Construct signature
σ ←< R,S, T,W,
J,K, h, s, nV , nT >
σ, m
Verifier Verify One
verifyBlindCre(R,S, T,W, pkI)
= accept
R′1 ← [s]J − [h]K
R′2 ← [s]S − [h]W
c′ ← H3(R||S||T ||W ||nV )
h′ ←
H4(c
′||m||J ||K||bsn||R′1||R
′
2||nT )
if h′ 6= h then abort
(b) SIGN/VERIFY operation
Fig. 1: Symbolic representation of ECC-DAA message flow diagrams
LINK: The LINK operation may be used by a VERIFIER to
check if two or more signatures, σ, are linked. Linkability
is controlled in ECC-DAA by the value of the basename bsn
either being set or unset. If bsn = ⊥ then an ASIGNER will
select a fresh group element, J , uniformly at random, else
it computes J = H1(bsn). The ASIGNER then sends J to
its PSIGNER, which then computes K = [tsk]J . Thus, if J is
always a hash of bsn then a PLATFORM’s messages will be
linkable because J and K remain constant in all ECC-DAA SIGN
responses. This assumes that each of the signatures came from
the same PLATFORM signed with its ECC-DAA secret key tsk.
III. MODELLING THE PROTOCOL IN TAMARIN
A. The TAMARIN PROVER
TAMARIN [21], [34] is a state-of-the-art protocol verification
tool for symbolic modelling. It supports unbounded verification,
mutable global state, and flexible user- defined equational
theories. Protocols are modelled using multiset rewriting rules
and properties are specified in a first-order logic fragment.
The tool offers automatic verification succeeding in many
cases, as well as an interactive verification mode with manual
proof tree traversal. The tool provides both proofs, and
disproofs by counter-example, but may not terminate due to
the undecidability of the underlying problem.
Dolev-Yao adversary. We use the standard adversary in
the symbolic model: the Dolev-Yao (DY) adversary [35]. The
DY adversary is a very strong network adversary, with full
control over the network: it can intercept, block, replay, and
send any message on the network. Additionally, the adversary
learns all the content in all messages it sees, unless they are
cryptographically protected. Furthermore, if the DY adversary
knows (or has derived) the appropriate keys, it can encrypt and
decrypt messages. The cryptography used is assumed perfect,
i.e., the hash functions used are cryptographically secure and
the adversary cannot encrypt or decrypt messages without
knowledge of the right key. The precise capabilities of the
adversary and the assumptions on the cryptographic primitives
used are encoded in the equational theory specified.
Terms and equations. In a symbolic model, all messages
are described as terms, for example aenc(m, pk(k)) represents
the asymmetric encryption of some plaintext m under a public
key pk(k), rather than dealing with bitstrings and probabilities,
as is done in the computational model. Then, one defines a
signature Σ as a number of operators, e.g., aenc, each equipped
with an arity, i.e., the number of arguments it accepts (Note that
Σ is not a cryptographic signature). Terms are constructed by
applying operators to constants, variables, and other operators
recursively.
The cryptographic properties of the used primitives are then
specified as equations. The example of asymmetric encryption
introduced above would also contain a decryption operator
adec, and an equation adec(aenc(m, pk(k)), k) = m that
allows extracting the plaintext message m using the private
key k associated with the used public key pk(k). Note that
the equations specified completely characterise all possible
derivations, as the perfect cryptography assumption is used,
meaning there is no other way to break the used primitives.
A set of equations, together with the underlying signature, is
called an equational theory. TAMARIN allows convergent (i.e.,
both confluent and terminating) equational theories [36] that
additionally satisfy the Finite Variant Property [37].
Facts, states, rules, and labelled multiset rewriting.
Distinguished terms, called facts, consisting of a top-level
fact symbol of fixed arity and with standard terms as arguments,
build the state. Specifically, a state is a finite multiset of facts,
and it represents the current state of a protocol’s execution,
including all participants local states, the adversary knowledge,
and messages currently on the network. The distinguished
Fr(x) fact represents fresh values and the semantics of all
other facts is given by the specified rules. The rules model
the possible actions of protocol participants as well as the
adversary actions.
Rules are given as triples, written [l]--[a]->[r] with l, a,
r finite sequences of facts, representing the premises, actions,
and conclusions respectively. As a general DY is considered, a
modelling convention is that messages are sent to the network
using a special Out fact, received from the network by In and
the adversary knowledge is represented by K facts. Note that the
adversary can apply all the equations given in the equational
theory specified and modify messages as it wants, assuming it
has the necessary cryptographic keys available.
The set of rules specifying the protocol and adversary then
yields a labelled transition system, with the initial state being
the empty multiset. TAMARIN changes its state multiset by
finding an applicable rule, i.e. one whose premises match
existing facts within the current state multiset to obtain a new
state multiset where the facts used in the premise are replaced
with those from the rule’s conclusion. The actions associated
with each rule instance in the execution yield the trace. Each
rule instance and all associated actions are timestamped with
the timepoint of their occurrence with ordered timepoints.
Properties are then specified on top of the action trace using
first-order logic. First, we give an example protocol, and then
will consider properties in more detail.
Example 1. Let us consider a simple protocol that sends a
message encrypted under a public key. The first rule creates
a public/private key pair, which can be used arbitrarily often.
The second rule describes the sender, which picks a fresh
value to send, and looks up the intended recipient’s public
key and outputs that value encrypted under this key. The third
rule shows the recipient receiving this message, looking up its
own private key k and accepting the message only if it was
encrypted under the related public key pk(k). Otherwise the
rule cannot be triggered.
Create: [Fr(~k)]--[]->[!Ltk($A,~k),!Pk($A,pk(~k))]
Send: [!Pk($R,pubk), Fr(~m)] --[Sent(~m)]-> [Out(aenc(~m,pubk))]
Receive: [!Ltk($R,k), In(aenc(m,pk(k)))] --[Received(m)]-> []
Security property specification. Trace properties such
as secrecy and agreement are expressed as first-order logic
formulae. These formulae introduce variables to reason about
the ordering of actions traces ([38] provides more detail). A
formula φ may hold on trace tr and we lift the semantics
to a set of traces Tr. We say a formula holds for all traces
when it is satisfied by any trace in the set (which we use to
prove security properties), and we say that there exists a trace
satisfying the formula (“exists- trace” semantics) when there
is at least one trace on which the formula holds. We use this
semantics in general to show that some protocol is executable,
or a specific state can be reached.
Example 2. Extending Example 1 we define an executable
property which states that the final rule may be executed:
lemma executable_example: exists-trace
"Ex z #i. Received(z) @#i"
and this formula is satisfied in the example by executing
the three rules once each, in order, with the message being
forwarded from the Send rule’s Out fact to the Receive rule’s
In fact by the network adversary.
An additional feature we make use of is that of restrictions.
Restrictions are useful to limit the set of traces one wants
to consider in protocol analysis. We employ a number of
restrictions on our model of ECC-DAA to restrict the branching
behaviour.
In addition to trace properties, TAMARIN supports equiv-
alence properties as well. These are necessary for privacy
properties such as unlinkability. For equivalence properties it is
required that two instances of the protocol are indistinguishable
for the adversary. The instances are defined by use of diff -terms
(taking two arguments), and in essence yield two versions of the
same protocol, with the differences limited to the terms under
the diff -operator. TAMARIN checks observational equivalence
on this (see [39] for details) by comparing the two resulting
systems and ensuring that the adversary cannot distinguish the
two for any protocol execution and adversary behaviour.
B. The model
Using TAMARIN we implemented a symbolic model of ECC-
DAA that captures the behaviour and split roles of I-MECH4.
Our model captures these behaviours in the presence of a DY
adversary. From Figure 1b it is clear that the functionality of
the protocol is different depending on whether the basename
(bsn) is fresh or fixed. This distinction is best captured using
different variants of our model to aid traceability and will only
be important during the analysis. It would have been possible
to produce one model to reflect the functionality of both J
being fixed and fresh but this would have meant duplication of
rules and introduction new state facts to control the firing of
the rules. This would have made the model less readable. By
producing two variants of the model it means that the rules
within each variant are more easily matched to the functionality
of the ECC-DAA scheme and provides a traceable mapping to
the standards document.
Our model is more comprehensive than [18] as it is finer-
grained and closer to the standards document. In addition, we
also, for the first time, capture in a symbolic setting, all the
authentication and privacy properties of ECC-DAA in a single
model. The full TAMARIN model is available [24] and contains
23 rules and comprises of over 1300 lines of TAMARIN code.
We begin by describing the equational theory for our ECC-
DAA models. We construct a signature, Σ, to capture the
cryptographic operators, where aenc/2 is a binary operator
and more generally f/n introduces an n-ary operator called f .
Σ = {aenc/2, adec/2, pk/1, MAC/2, verifyMAC/3,
accept/0, H2/5, multp/2, plus/2, minus/2, U/2,
calcU/1, verifyCre/5, verifyBlindCre/5, H1/1,
H3/5, H4/8, PRF/3, compute_s/2, calcR1/1,
calcR2/1, checkAnon/5, deanon/0}
The aenc, adec and pk operators come from the
asymmetric-encryption built-in. The multiplication operator
is represented as ’multp’, addition by ’plus’, and subtraction
by ’minus’. The properties of the other operators in Σ are
defined as equations and we describe each in turn.
Equation 1. Message Authentication Codes (MAC): To
model MACs used in the JOIN operation for providing authen-
tication and integrity during the challenge-response between a
PSIGNER and ISSUER we define the following equation:
verifyMAC(m,MAC(m, k), k) = accept
Given a message m, the MAC of m signed under key k,
and the key k, we can model that a MAC has been signed
and constructed correctly with knowledge of k. Successful
application of this equation will reduce to the accept constant.
Equation 2. DAA Credential Verification: ECC-DAA has two
different credential verification stages, one which verifies that
a credential, cre, received by the ISSUER and signed by a
PSIGNER was correctly constructed in the JOIN operation. The
other allows other VERIFIERs to verify a randomised credential
ĉre in the SIGN operation.
One of the final steps of the JOIN operation is to verify
that the credentials, (A,B,C), are received from the ISSUER
and that the element D constructed by the PSIGNER, that is
dependent on B also originates from the same ISSUER. To
achieve this we express the equation verifyCre to take A, B,
C, D and the ISSUER’s pkI as inputs. If the ISSUER’s secret
key embedded within A, B, C and D corresponds to the same
ISSUER pkI , then the cre is valid.
verifyCre(A,B,C,D, pk(skI)) = accept
The equation in the model fully defines A, B, C and D to be
the appropriate terms, for example A is multp(creRandom,P1).
During the VERIFY operation VERIFIERs are required to
validate the randomised credential, ĉre=< R,S, T,W >
that is constructed from A, B, C and D by multiplying
i by a randomly chosen factor l. The randomising of the
credential takes place during the SIGN operation by the ASIGNER,
where each element of the cre is randomised by l; for
example, multp(l,multp(creRandom,P1)), etc. The validation
is expressed as the equation verifyBlindCre, and as in the
previous equation ensures that the secret key of the ISSUER
and public key of the ISSUER match. Again R, S, T and W
in the equation are fully expanded in the model.
verifyBlindCre(R,S, T,W, pk(skI)) = accept
The following two equations capture our mathematical
abstractions of the ECC-DAA non-interactive proof of knowledge
within our ECC-DAA model.
Equation 3. Calculation of U ′:
The zero-knowledge proof of knowledge (ZKPK) in the
ISSUER JOIN Two step of the JOIN operation (Figure 1a) is that the
two values of the hash H2, i.e., v and v′, are computed equally
by the PSIGNER and ISSUER respectively. The structures of the
hashes are identical, differing on only the U term. Therefore,
to demonstrate ZKPK in the symbolic setting we are required
to show that U ′ is equal to U during the construction of the
ISSUER’s v′. This is defined using the following equation.
calcU(minus(multp(w,P1),multp(v,Q2))) = U(u, P1)
The functionality of the equation represents the following
reduction:
U ′ = [w]P1− [v]Q2
= [u+ vtsk]P1− [v][tsk]P1
= [u]P1 + [vtsk]P1− [vtsk]P1
= [u]P1
= U
In the TAMARIN model the equation is fully expanded to
define w and v explicitly and what we show here is the structure
of the equation.
Equation 4. DAA Signature Verification: The ZKPK in
the ECC-DAA VERIFY operation requires that the two hash
values, i.e., h and h′, are the same, and h is defined in
PSIGNER SIGN One in Figure 1b. Their H4 structures are
identical apart from the R1 and R2 terms in h and R′1 and R
′
2
terms in h′. Therefore, we provide two equations to state that
R′1 reduces to R1 and similarly for R
′
2:
calcR1(minus(multp(s, J),multp(h,K))) = multp(r, J)
and R′2 is equal to R2:
calcR2(minus(multp(s, S),multp(h,W ))) = multp(r, S)
Similar to the above calcU equation the details of each term
within calcR1 and calcR2 are fully expanded in the TAMARIN
model.
Equation 5. DAA De-anonymisation: In the event a PSIGNER
DAA key, tsk, is compromised and known by the adversary, it
is possible to identify messages produced by a specific PSIGNER.
We captured this in the checkAnon equation which takes as
its input the following terms from a given ECC-DAA signature:
checkAnon(S,W, J,K, tsk) = deanon
If the tsk matches in these formulae then the signature can be
linked to the PSIGNER whose tsk was revealed. The functionality
of the equation represents the following computation:
S = [l]B
W = [l]D = [l][tsk]B = [tsk][l]B = [tsk]S
K = [tsk]J
Hence, an adversary with knowledge of a PLATFORMs DAA
key and DAA signatures can check whether W and K can be
computed by multiplying S and J by tsk respectively to reveal
whether the PLATFORM produced the signature.
Channels. Chen et al. in [10] note that the communication
between an ASIGNER and a PSIGNER is done in a secure
manner. In our TAMARIN model we define the communication
between these two entities over a Secure Channel to provide
an appropriate abstraction. Secure channels have the property
of being both confidential and authentic. This means that an
adversary can neither modify nor learn messages that are sent
over the channel. They have previously been used in TAMARIN
in [40] and we follow their modelling ideas.
Secure channel communication uses two rules, ChanOut_S
and ChanIn_S, to create an extra layer of abstraction based on
linear facts to explicitly model secure channels. This prevents
communication being broadcast via the adversary, over the
standard In and Out channels.
rule ChanOut_S:
[ Out_S( $A , $B , x ), !Paired( $A, $B ) ]
--[ ChanOut_S( $A , $B, x ) ]->
[ Sec( $A , $B , x ) ]
The fact Out_S($A,$B,x) models that the PSIGNER or ASIGNER
(A, B or vice versa) sends a message x on the secure channel.
The persistent fact !Paired($A,$B) is a predicate on the channel
storing state information about the one to one association
between a ASIGNER and PSIGNER. This ensures that only the
designated PSIGNER can communicate with its corresponding
ASIGNER. The conclusion of the rule is a linear fact containing
the message x, that the adversary cannot see or forge.
rule ChanIn_S:
[ Sec( $A , $B , x ) ]
--[ ChanIn_S( $A , $B, x ) ]->
[ In_S( $A , $B , x ) ]
The linear fact Sec(...) ensures that the secure channel is
replay protected, i.e., when the message x is consumed by
one of the paired entities, x is not stored to be replayed later
as a consequence of the shared In_S($A,$B,x) fact which is
not known to the adversary. The secure channel is justified as
being replay protected as this channel is only ever used on the
PLATFORM between the ASIGNER and PSIGNER.
Recall that in a JOIN operation the communication between
an ISSUER and a PSIGNER needs to be encrypted under the
public endorsement key. Note that — unlike the secure channel
between PSIGNER and ASIGNER— this communication can be
observed by the adversary, as shown in Figure 2.
C. Model Abstractions and Restrictions
To simplify the number of cases in the proof, we consider
the VERIFIER to be an abstract role. This means that a VERIFIER
is not a PLATFORM in our model whereas in reality it could
be another PLATFORM or some other device, e.g., embedded
device. An abstraction of this role is possible as a PSIGNER is
not required to verify a ECC-DAA signature. We have abstracted
the ISSUER’s public key (X,Y ) and private key (x, y) to pkI
and skI respectively.
The most important abstraction is how we modelled “a
secure and authentic channel between the principal signer and
the group membership issuer”, since the definition of such a
channel was outside the scope of the standards document. As
stated earlier ISO/IEC 20008-2:2013 refers to Chen et al. [10]
who propose the use of a MAC and the TCG propose the
use of a public endorsement key [33] to create a secure and
authentic channel within mechanism 4. The model of using a
MAC is already captured by Equation 1 and in the next section
we describe our abstraction of the TCG mechanism.
We also employ a number of restrictions in our model of
ECC-DAA (we refer to them as A1 - A6 to avoid confusion with
R1 and R2 in the model description):
A1 - Single Issuer: We consider the ISSUER to be a distinct
role in the protocol. This choice has been made to simplify
the proof, and it is important to note that the ISSUER can still
be a corrupt entity.
A2 - Unique Pairing: We constrain a PSIGNER to belong to
a single unique ASIGNER, and a ASIGNER to have exactly one
PSIGNER. This models an ideal system and is representative of
the real world.
A3 - Single Platform Initialisation: Once a PLATFORM
has performed its SETUP to generate its unique values and
endorsement key-pair, it is not allowed to do this again. This
restriction captures the manufacture process where secrets are
installed to a PSIGNER at manufacture time.
A4 - Equality checks: We use the TAMARIN equality
restriction so that all instances of an equality action in a trace
ensure that both arguments within an action are equal. We use
them for modelling the verification of MACs, cre, ĉre and
ECC-DAA signatures.
A5 - Inequality checks: Such checks are used to ensure that
two arguments of a check are not equal in a trace. This is used
specifically during the PLATFORM initialisation rule to specify
the ASIGNER and PSIGNER identities are different, which is also
the case in practice.
D. Modelling the ECC-DAA operations
In Section II we noted that there are five ECC-DAA operations
and each of them match to one or more TAMARIN rules. This
section summarises the mapping from operations to TAMARIN
Fig. 2: Network with all communication routed through the adversary
rules and provides some illustrative examples. The SETUP
operation corresponds to two rules, one to capture the setup of
the ISSUER and one to setup a PLATFORM. The LINK operation
maps to one rule. The JOIN operation maps to eight rules,
representing ISSUER JOIN One etc. from Figure 1a and three
of the rules represent the forwarding of messages from the
ISSUER to the PSIGNER via the ASIGNER over the secure channel.
Similarly the SIGN operation maps to four sign rules. The
VERIFY operation maps to two rules in order to capture the
behaviour of a VERIFIER verifying the message it sent and
verifying a message sent by a different VERIFIER.
The rule for setting up a PLATFORM is defined as follows:
rule PLATFORM_SETUP:
let pk_ek = pk( ~sk_ek ) in
[ Fr( ~sk_ek ) ]
--[ PlatformInit (), PlatformStart( $AS , $PS ),
Create( $PS ), Neq($AS , $PS),
UniqueExecJoin( ’PS_SETUP ’ ),
Unique_Pairing( $PS ),
Unique_Pairing( $AS ) ]->
[ !F_PSEk($PS ,~sk_ek),!F_PSPkEk($PS ,pk_ek),
!F_Paired($PS ,$AS),!F_Paired($AS ,$PS),
St_PlatformInit( $AS , $PS ),
Out( pk_ek ) ]
The PLATFORM_SETUP rule initialises the PLATFORM, which is
a combination of an ASIGNER and PSIGNER.
In the premise three fresh terms are generated to compute
the tsk and the PSIGNER endorsement key-pair. The ISSUER
parameters Ki are also required in the generation of tsk. There
are a number of action labels, for example Unique_Pairing
that captures the restriction A2. The conclusion of the rule
stores the generated terms and introduces a linear fact to
control moving to the next step of the ECC-DAA scheme. Note
that the persistent fact !F_PSPkEk stores a PSIGNER’s public
endorsement key. The fact that this key is installed in the
PSIGNER at manufacturing time and shared with the ISSUER
is modelled using the Out(pk_ek) fact. Note that this also
makes the key available to the adversary in our model. The
public endorsement key, pkekps is only ever used in the JOIN
operation by the ISSUER so that the ISSUER can authenticate to
a PSIGNER. This is shown in the following fragment of the
PS_JOIN_ONE rule:
rule PS_JOIN_ONE:
let
tsk = PRF( ~DAASeed , Ki, ~cnt )
pk_ek = pk( sk_ek )
msg = aenc( < ’ISSUER_REQ ’, km, ni >, pk_ek )
gamma = MAC( < ’gamma ’, P1, Q2, v, w >, km )
...
in
[ In_S( $AS , $PS , msg ), Fr(~ DAASeed), Fr(~cnt),
!F_IssuerKi( $I, Ki ), ...
]
--[ ... HonestPS( tsk ) ... ]->
[ Out_S( $PS , $AS , <’PS_RESP_OUT ’, ..., gamma > )
!F_PSDaaSeed( $PS , ~DAASeed ),
!F_PSCnt($PS ,~cnt),!F_PSTsk($PS ,tsk) ]
The tsk is generated using a pseudo-random function, PRF,
which was introduced as part of Σ. It provides a fine-grained
traceable abstraction to the construction of tsk, rather than
a fresh term. While these example rules do not allow the
adversary to learn the secret endorsement key, skekps , or the
secret DAA key tsk, we have also defined two additional
TAMARIN rules that allow the adversary to learn the secret
keys. This models a possible threat of corrupted PLATFORMs
that can be identified during the security analysis. Recall that
that I-MECH4 requires a secure and authentic channel for
communication between PLATFORMs and ISSUERs and within
the model a MAC is constructed to ensure the integrity of Q2,
v and w in the JOIN operation. The verification of the MAC
occurs in another rule in the JOIN operation, and this is where
Equation 1 is called.
One example of a SIGN rule is as follows:
rule PS_SIGN_ONE:
let
PSSign = < ’PSSign ’, c, ~J, S, nv, bsn >
tsk = PRF( DAASeed , Ki, cnt )
K = multp( tsk , ~J )
R1 = multp( ~randS1 , ~J )
R2 = multp( ~randS1 , S )
h = H5( c, nv, ~J, K, bsn , R1, R2, ~nt )
s = compute_s( ~randS1 , tsk )
PSResp = < ’PSSignResp ’, K, h, s, ~nt >
in
[ In_S( $AS , $PS , PSSign ), Fr( ~nt ),
Fr( ~randS1 ), !F_PSTsk( $PS , tsk ) ]
--[ PSSignOne( ), DAASign( tsk , ~J, nv ),
UniqueExecSign( ’PS_SIGN_ONE ’ ) ]->
[ Out_S( $PS , $AS , PSResp ) ]
Goal Lemma Model A Model B
G1 functional_correctness_group_verification X X
G2 functional_correctness X X
G3 functional_correctness_dishonest_send X X
G4 aliveness X X
G5 weak_agreement_any_reveal X X
G6 weak_agreement × ×
G7 ni_agreement_any_reveal X X
G8 ni_agreement × ×
G9 i_agreement × ×
G10 secrecy_cre × ×
G11 can_be_deanonymised X X
G12 user_controlled_independent_link_tokens X n/a
G13 user_controlled_linkability n/a X
Goal Observational Equivalence Model C
G14 unlinkability X
Fig. 3: Summary of Results
This rule represents the PSIGNER SIGN One step in Figure 1b
where the input to the rule over the secure channel In_S are
the terms produced by the ASIGNER from ASIGNER SIGN One
in Figure 1b. The premise also generates two fresh terms nt
and randS1, which correspond to nT and r respectively. The
ECC-DAA key, tsk, is known by the PSIGNER and is used in
the generation of K which, together with the term J , is used
for controlled traceability of signed messages to a PLATFORM.
The first action in the PS_SIGN_ONE rule simply denotes what
rule is being fired, and the others support the expression of
security and privacy properties. The conclusion securely outputs
PSResp to the ASIGNER which includes K to control traceability,
the hash h capturing the proof of knowledge for the ECC-
DAA SIGN operation, and s which is needed to recompute h by
the VERIFIER and a nonce nT .
IV. THREAT MODEL AND PROPERTIES
All the properties we establish for our ECC-DAA model are
identified in Figure 3. We use X to indicate that the property
holds, and × is used when the property does not hold. Recall
in Section III-B two variants of the model were introduced
and they are referred to as Model A and Model B in Figure 3
respectively. Model A represents the basename being unset
whereas Model B represents the basename as a constant. In
the analysis of unlinkability in Section IV-C we introduce and
justify Model C.
A. Threat Model
As stated in Section III-A the model considers a Dolev-Yao
adversary. Notably, the DY can compromise a PSIGNER to gain
knowledge of the secret endorsement key, and the secret DAA
key. Additionally, the adversary can corrupt the ISSUER and
learn its secret key.
B. Security Properties
In this section we focus on how we encode the correctness,
authentication, and secrecy properties, as given by goals G1
- G10. We provide the TAMARIN code for lemmas G1 and
G6 as examples in Appendix B. The definition of correctness
from [12] simply refers to a correct execution of the scheme.
Normally within a symbolic setting correctness is a notion that
applies over all traces. Hence correctness here in a symbolic
setting is also in the context of a single run of the protocol (and
uses exists-trace) but we refer to it as functional correctness
to avoid confusion. Our lemmas not only encode correctness
from [12] we also explore correctness of a group signature to
build confidence in our model.
In the model we additionally define authentication lemmas
to determine what level of authentication the scheme satisfies.
This enables us to establish the authentication in the scheme
in the usual way using formal analysis.
G1 Functional Correctness (group verification): ISO/IEC
20008-2:2013 mechanism 4 [11] defines that group sig-
nature verification is required for ECC-DAA which means
there exist two VERIFIERs, one that sends a message to
be signed by a PLATFORM, and another VERIFIER that veri-
fies the message. This property is captured by our lemma
functional_correctness_group_verification which states that
there exists a send from one VERIFIER that is then signed by
a signer PLATFORM, and verified by a different VERIFIER than
the one which sent the message to be signed.
G2 Functional Correctness: We encode the ECC-DAA prop-
erty as one lemma. The lemma states that if both the PLATFORM
and VERIFIER are honest, the signatures and their links will
be accepted by a VERIFIER. This means that the following
must have occurred: A) SETUP has occurred and the ISSUER
has generated its secret key and published its parameters. B)
JOIN has successfully executed under the ISSUER secret key
and parameters, therefore producing a ECC-DAA credential
including the PSIGNERs generated ECC-DAA key (tsk). C) SIGN
has produced a ECC-DAA signature σ0 on the message m0 with
tsk and a randomised credential ĉre. Given the steps A, B and
C have successfully executed then a ECC-DAA VERIFY on σ0
has executed to accept the signature.
G3 Functional Correctness of SIGN in presence of an
adversary: The lemma is used to prove the ECC-DAA SIGN
operation, in the presence of an adversary that sends a message
on the network. The intuition for this lemma is that there
exists a VERIFIER that receives and verifies a signed ECC-DAA
message which may have been sent by the adversary or the
adversary has corrupted a PLATFORM so that she could forge
a message. Given the capabilities of the adversary she would
be able to generate and inject a message on the network and
request that a signer executes the SIGN protocol and signs
the message. This would result in a signed message that was
crafted by the adversary, which all other group members would
be able to verify. This property is captured by our lemma
functional_correctness_dishonest_send.
G4 − G9 Authentication in JOIN: In [41], Lowe identifies
a hierarchy of authentication specifications. In this paper we
explore which form of authentication as defined by Lowe our
ECC-DAA scheme satisfies: aliveness, weak agreement, non-
injective agreement and injective agreement.
Aliveness is a form of authentication which guarantees that
when an initiator A completes a run of the protocol, apparently
interacting with another agent B, then B has run the protocol,
1 lemma secrecy_cre:
2 "All A B x #i. Secret(A,B,x) @ i
3 ==>
4 not(Ex #k. K(x) @ k)
5 |(Ex C #r. IssuerKeyReveal(C) @ r & Honest(C) @ i)
6 |(Ex C #r. RevealEK(C) @ r & Honest(C) @ i)
7 |(Ex C #r. RevealTsk(C) @ r & Honest(C) @ i)"
(a) secrecy_cre (G10)
1 lemma can_be_deanonymised: exists -trace
2 "Ex AS PS sigma tsk #i #j #k #l.
3 ( PlatformStart(AS, PS) @ i
4 & RevealPSTsk(PS, tsk) @ j
5 & ASSendFullSignature(AS, PS, sigma)@ k
6 & DeAnonymised(PS, tsk , sigma) @ l )"
(b) can_be_deanonymised (G11)
1 lemma user_controlled_independent_link_tokens:
2 "All k kP j jP #i .
3 CompareLinkTokens(k,kP,j,jP) @ i
4 & not(j = jP)
5 ==> not(k = kP)"
(c) user_controlled_independent_link_tokens (G12)
1 lemma user_controlled_linkability:
2 "All k kP j jP #i .
3 (All #i #j x . UniqueExecJoin(x) @ i
4 & UniqueExecJoin(x) @ j
5 ==> #i = #j)
6 & CompareLinkTokens(k,kP,j,jP) @ i
7 & j = jP
8 ==> k = kP"
(d) user_controlled_linkability (G13)
Fig. 4: Secrecy and User-controlled Linkability lemmas
but not necessarily with A. In the ECC-DAA scheme the initiator
A is the ISSUER and an agent B is a PLATFORM.
Weak agreement is a slightly stronger form of authentication
that guarantees when an initiator A completes a run of the
protocol apparently with another agent B, then B has also been
running the protocol apparently with A. This gives a stronger
claim about the ISSUER running with a PLATFORM.
Lowe’s non-injective agreement is a stronger authentication
property than weak agreement; it adds a further condition to
ensure that the two agents, A and B, agree on the roles they
are taking and agree on the data items used in their message
exchange. In the ECC-DAA scheme non-injective agreement
would guarantee that the ISSUER and a PLATFORM both agree
upon the completion of a JOIN operation. This means that
in the JOIN operation, the contents of the received messages
correspond to the sent messages for the specific JOIN session.
Lowe in [41] also defines injective agreement as an authenti-
cation property. Injective agreement adds a further constraint on
top of non-injective agreement, which is that there is a unique
matching partner run for each completed run of an agent. The
idea of injective agreement is to prevent relay attacks.
We capture these properties in lemmas as G4, G5, G6, G7,
G8 and G9 respectively. Note that weak agreement and non-
injective agreement are captured two lemmas respectively. The
first variant of the lemmas enables us to prove authentication
if any key reveal has happened and if keys have been revealed
then the lemma hold vacuously. The second variant of the
lemmas guarantees that both the PSIGNER and ISSUER are honest
when a PSIGNER has authenticated to an ISSUER (i.e. they have
completed the JOIN operation) but all other entities may have
leaked their keys by that point.
G10 Secrecy in JOIN: The lemma is used to prove secrecy of
a credential cre in the ECC-DAA JOIN operation. The intuition
for this lemma is that the ISSUER and a PLATFORM have
established a shared secret, since the cre is sent to a PLATFORM
encrypted under its public endorsement key. We model this by
the adversary not knowing the cre, unless any of the involved
parties keys have been revealed. This means that the ISSUER’s
key has been revealed, or the endorsement key reveal of the
used PLATFORM, or the tsk key reveal of the used PLATFORM.
This property is captured by our lemma secrecy_cre.
C. Privacy Properties
The purpose of this section is to capture the user-controlled
anonymity, and user-controlled tracability properties of ECC-
DAA by Brickell et al. in [12].
G11 and G14 User-controlled Anonymity: User-controlled
anonymity in [12] requires two properties to hold. Firstly
anonymity, it is hard to recover the identity of the signer
from its signature unless its secret key is known. Secondly
user- controlled unlinkability, ensures that an adversary cannot
tell if the signatures were produced by one or two PSIGNERs.
Within TAMARIN unlinkability is established via observa-
tional equivalence (G14). The intuition behind this is that
the adversary is given two signatures from one signer, or
one each from two signers. However, the adversary is unable
to distinguish between these two instances. To encode this
in TAMARIN requires augmenting our model to generate
two signatures from one PLATFORM, or two signatures from
two different PLATFORMs. It is possible to express this using
TAMARIN rules in the existing models but the resultant state
space was too large for exploration. Therefore, we developed a
third model, Model C, to support this analysis which simplified
the model of the JOIN operation but did not reduce the
adversary’s capability as a result of the simplification. With
this revised model observational equivalence holds applying
diff on two signatures, and hence unlinkability is established.
As stated above anonymity should not be broken unless the
key is leaked. Therefore, the unlinkability above already covers
the case that anonymity cannot be broken when the key is not
revealed. Model C does not permit a tsk key to be revealed and
since two signatures cannot be distinguished to be from the
same or different PSIGNERs then this undesirable behaviour is
not possible. In models A and B which do allow for a tsk reveal,
we formulate an additional lemma, can_be_deanonymised
(G11). It states that, if the tsk is known to the adversary then the
identity of the PLATFORM is revealed and therefore anonymity
is broken. Thus G14 and G11 together address user-controlled
anonymity.
G12− 13 User-controlled Traceability: The user-controlled
traceability in [12] requires two properties to hold; the first
property is unforgeability and relies on the perfect cryptography
assumption; while the second one is user-controlled linkability.
In our ECC-DAA model we do not need to capture the first
property as a lemma because the symbolic method relies on
cryptography being perfect. The second property means that
if two ECC-DAA signatures are computed with the same bsn,
i.e., the J values are equal, then signatures are linkable as
coming from the same PLATFORM. Alternatively, if the ECC-DAA
signatures are computed with two different bsns and hence the
J values are different then the signatures are unlinkable. The
LINK operation in the ECC-DAA scheme is used to ascertain
whether signatures are linkable or not.
We encode two lemmas to determine whether two sig-
natures are linkable. In Model A we define the lemma
user_controlled_independent_link_tokens (G12). The intu-
ition for this lemma is that the corresponding link tokens
of two ECC-DAA signatures are different since the J’s are
unique. The action CompareLinkTokens appears in a trace only
after two signatures have been constructed.
In Model B we expect to establish linkability. We define a
lemma user_controlled_linkability (G13) to capture linka-
bility. It is expressed as the contrapositive to the way linkability
is expressed in [12]. The lemma states that if two ECC-DAA
signatures are computed by the same PLATFORM with the fixed
J then the LINK operation would yield linkability and hence
the K’s would be equal.
In G13 we only consider traces for a single PLATFORM. If the
traces included two PLATFORMs and each created a signature
with a fixed J we would not be able to establish linkability
since the K values within the signatures would be different.
Note that anonymity within this variant of the model does not
hold since linkability is present.
Our model allows us to create two signatures explicitly within
a trace and therefore, linkability can be expressed as a trace
property as discussed. This means we do not have to encode
user-controlled traceability via observational equivalence.
V. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
In this section we review our analysis of our ECC-DAA model
and present both a weakness in the SIGN operation and an attack
on the JOIN operation.
Clarifying parts of the ECC-DAA operations which were not
stated in I-MECH4, e.g., discovering the source of the basename
used in the SIGN operation, was a significant task even before
the TAMARIN modelling analysis. Identifying the appropriate
modelling abstractions and restrictions for the analysis was
necessary because TAMARIN would not have been able to
support proving the model otherwise. For example, to encode
our calcR1 equation requires 34 operators that comprises 49
terms on the LHS of the equation with the abstraction of
the s term. Similarly for calcR2 with the abstraction the
equation requires 40 operators and 54 terms, whereas without
the abstraction it requires 67 operators and 94 terms.
Determining how to express the lemmas to capture the
security and privacy properties was also an iterative process in
order to ensure that they clearly mapped to those in [12].
We analysed our models on the following machine spec-
ification: Intel i7-7600U (2 cores) @ 2.80GHz and 16GB
RAM using TAMARIN version 1.5.0 [42]. The model itself
is reasonably efficient on memory and consumes 3GB of
RAM in the course of a proof, however a great deal of the
processor resources is required to perform the proof. For the
models presented in this paper, the proofs and disproofs for
Model A (which focuses on user-controlled untraceability) takes
3 minutes, and Model B (which focuses on user-controlled
traceability) takes 10 minutes to verify. Figure 3 summarises
the results of all of the properties of our ECC-DAA models.
The results affirm that our formal model of the ECC-DAA
scheme meets all the functional correctness properties in [12]
(G1 to G3). It also demonstrates that standard authentication
properties are met when all the participants are honest and there
are no key reveals and that the highest level of authentication
that can be achieved is non-injective agreement (G4, G5
and G7 hold). When keys are revealed the highest level of
authentication that can be achieved is only aliveness (G4) of
a PSIGNER whenever the ISSUER completes the run of a JOIN
operation, apparently with a PSIGNER that has previously been
running the JOIN operation.
The privacy analysis also demonstrates that it is not possible
to link two ECC-DAA signatures when the J’s are fresh (G12).
Conversely, the analysis shows that it is possible to link two
ECC-DAA signatures when the J are fixed (G13). G12 vacuously
holds in Model B and G13 vacuously holds in Model A. G11
also holds in both Models.
Notably, Models A and B are auto-provable using
TAMARIN’s default heuristics, and this was invaluable when
changes to the model occurred as it allowed all the ECC-DAA
operations to be re-proved quickly.
The analysis of G14 established unlinkability but proving
this using Model C required a guided proof.
Our analysis of functional correctness of the SIGN operation
in the presence of an adversary indicates that I-MECH4 may
not be protected from honest sender starvation and more
interestingly resource exhaustion. Honest sender starvation
is expected in a DY setting where the adversary can block or
modify a message sent by a VERIFIER, therefore the VERIFIER
would never receive a response to its message. Resource
exhaustion is where the signer expends effort to continually
sign messages since an adversary can submit its own message
m′ and n′V to a signer and it will produce a valid ECC-DAA
signature. The production of such a signature is a costly
operation.
Moreover, our model revealed that I-MECH4 is vulnerable
to a man-in-the-middle attack and an attack on secrecy,
when the security of any PSIGNER secret endorsement key
is compromised. This is the first symbolic analysis to highlight
these attacks for an ECC-DAA scheme. Therefore the lemmas
weak_agreement, ni_agreement, and secrecy_cre do not hold
when one or more secret endorsement key is compromised and
revealed to the adversary.
Note also that injective agreement does not hold since the
encrypted message that communicates the generated credential
to a PLATFORM can be replayed by the adversary. This is
because there is no freshness in the message communication
from the ISSUER in the JOIN operation. Hence, this violates the
requirement of a unique running session in order to establish
injective agreement.
A. Man-in-the-middle and Secrecy Attack and Fix
Our TAMARIN analysis indicates that the JOIN operation
(Figure 1a) cannot guarantee that the ISSUER authenticates
any PLATFORM if a single PSIGNER is corrupted, but that the
corrupted PLATFORM is still regarded by the ISSUER as being
honest. Additionally, in the JOIN operation our analysis indicates
that secrecy of any PLATFORM’s cre cannot be guaranteed, if
a single PSIGNER is corrupted. These attacks were found by
a man-in-the-middle attack when performing authentication
analysis in the context of an adversary revealing a PSIGNER
secret endorsement key (G6 and G8), and when performing
secrecy analysis in the context of another PSIGNER’s secret
endorsement key reveal (G10). Therefore, the security of I-
MECH4 relies heavily on the integrity of all PSIGNERs.
Both attacks require an ISSUER and two PLATFORMs, of which
one PLATFORM is corrupted by the adversary. The attack on
authentication shows that the ISSUER believes it has authenti-
cated with PLATFORMA, whereas it actually authenticated with
PLATFORMB . The attack is detailed in Figure 5. Additionally,
the attack on secrecy shows that the ISSUER believes it has
established a shared secret, cre, with PLATFORMA, whereas
the secret is shared with PLATFORMB and it is known by the
adversary. Our work affirms that these attacks are possible
in the standardised ECC-DAA scheme even when considering
the recommended ways of establishing a secure and authentic
channel (I-MECH4).
The following details the steps of the attack, shown in Fig-
ure 5, on authentication for an ISSUER and two PLATFORMs one
of which is corrupt:
1) For some PSIGNER the secret endorsement key (skekpsA)
is compromised, modelled by the DY revealing this key.
We refer to this entity as PLATFORMA.
2) There has been a honest PLATFORM and ISSUER SETUP,
we refer to these as PLATFORMB and ISSUER respectively.
Note that the ISSUER is unaware that the unrelated skekpsA
has been leaked.
3) The ISSUER sends out a JOIN request, JOINA, containing
nIA and MAC key kmA encrypted under the public
endorsement key pkekpsA for PLATFORMA.
4) The DY intercepts the JOINA request and with knowledge
of skekpsA decrypts the message and gains knowledge of
the nonce nIA and MAC key kmA. The DY then encrypts
nIA and kmA under PLATFORMB’s public endorsement
key pkekpsB .
5) PLATFORMB receives JOINA and forwards JOINA to its
PSIGNER. The PSIGNER follows the command to produce
Q2B , vB , wB and γB , and returns it to PLATFORMB .
6) This is the key step to the attack: the ISSUER receives and
validates the response for JOINA that was performed by
PLATFORMB . The ISSUER then continues to create the cre
elements < AA, BA, CA > and encrypts it under pkekpsA
and sends the message, {| < AA, BA, CA > |}pkekpsA ,
out on the network.
7) The DY intercepts the cre message encrypted under
pkekpsA and decrypts it with knowledge of skekpsA to
retrieve < AA, BA, CA >. The DY then re-encrypts this
under pkekpsB and forwards the message to ASIGNERB .
8) PLATFORMB receives {| < AA, BA, CA > |}pkekpsB and
forwards to its PSIGNER. The PSIGNER then creates its
part of the cre DB and returns < AA, BA, CA, DB > to
the ASIGNER. The ASIGNER then verifies this as a valid
credential.
9) The ISSUER believes it was running the JOIN operation
session with PLATFORMA under < AA, BA, CA >, when
actually PLATFORMB was committed to the JOIN operation
session with its self constructed DB .
The attack we identified is similar to one described by Backes
et al. in [16] on the pre-standardised RSA-DAA scheme. They
include the identity of a joining TPM in the zero-knowledge
proof as a fix to the attack. Chen et al. in [23] proposed an
alternative anonymous authentication to DAA which was also
susceptible to a comparable attack for a compromised TPM,
referred to as the Chosen Compromised TPM attack. For their
privacy-preserving Certificate Authority protocol they similarly
suggested that this type of attack could be removed by including
the public endorsement key of a TPM in the JOIN operation.
We also propose to include the PSIGNER’s identity using
its public endorsement key in the proof of knowledge v as
a fix to both attacks. This solution does not require any
change in the overall functionality of I-MECH4. Therefore
v ← H2(P1||Q2||U ||pkI ||nI) in PS JOIN One in Figure 1a is
amended to v ← H2(pkekps ||P1||Q2||U ||pkI ||nI) and v′ in
ISSUER JOIN Two is similarly amended.
We extended our model to capture this fix by modifying
the equation calcU to encapsulate the public endorsement key
within v. Additionally, we amended the two rules PS_JOIN_ONE
and ISSUER_JOIN_TWO to represent v and v′ respectively.
With this fix the vB in step 5 of the attack would additionally
contain pkekpsB for PLATFORMB . Therefore, step 6 of the attack
would not be possible since the ISSUER would produce a v′
based on its knowledge of pkekpsA. Consequently vB and v
′
A
computed by the ISSUER would not be equal and the JOIN
operation would abort. The TAMARIN theory for this fix can
be found in [24] and verifies the effectiveness of the change.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we present the development of a fine-grained
symbolic model of the ISO/IEC 20008-2:2013 Mechanism 4
PSignerB
skekpsB , pkI
ASignerB
pkI
PSignerA
skekpsA, pkI
ASignerA
pkI
DY
pkI , pkekpsA, pkekpsB
Issuer
pkekps , skI
skekpsA skekpsA
Issuer Join One
Fresh
kmA, nIA.
{|kmA, nIA|}pkekpsA
{|kmA, nIA|}pkekpsB{|kmA, nIA|}pkekpsB
PS Join One
tskB←PRF (DAASeed||KI ||cnt)
Decrypt message
to recover kmA and nIA
Fresh u, Compute:
Q2 ← [tskB ]P1; U ← [u]P1
v ← H2(P1||Q2||U ||pkI ||nIA)
w ← u+ [v]tskB
γ ←MAC(Q2, v, w)kmA
Q2, v, w, γ Q2, v, w, γ Q2, v, w, γ
Issuer Join Two
verifyMAC(m,γ, km) = accept
Compute
U ′ ← [w]P1− [v]Q2;
v′ ← H2(P1||Q2||U
′||pkI ||nI)
if v′ 6= v then abort
Fresh r
Generate creI ←< AA, BA, CA >
AA ← [r]P1; BA ← [skI ]A
CA ← [skI ]A+ [rskI ]Q2
{|creI |}pkekpsA
{|creI |}pkekpsB{|creI |}pkekpsB
PS Join Two
Decrypt message to recover creI
Compute DB ← [tskB ]B
cre←< AA, BA, CA, DB >
cre
AS Join Four
verifyCre(AA, BA, CA, DB , pkI) = accept
store cre
Fig. 5: Man-in-the-middle attack in the JOIN operation
standard together with the proposed implementations mecha-
nisms for a secure and authentic channel [10] [33]. The paper
also makes a contribution to how complex zero-knowledge
proofs can be captured for symbolic reasoning. This involved
defining an appropriate equational theory to represent the math-
ematical properties of the underlying cryptographic concepts
in the protocol. Our approach could similarly be used in
other schemes. The model contains lemmas to capture all
the correctness, security and privacy properties required by
the ISO/IEC 20008-2:2013 Mechanism 4. Even though our
TAMARIN model employed the secure and authentic channel
as recommended in the standard, we identified an attack using
TAMARIN. The attack reveals a fundamental issue with the
scheme, i.e., if a single PSIGNER is compromised then no
PSIGNER can be authenticated reliably. The attack is similar to
that reported by Backes et al. for the RSA-DAA scheme and
therefore highlights that the weakness is still present in ECC-
DAA. Backes et al. proposed a fix for the RSA-DAA scheme and
verified associated security properties. Our fix follows a similar
embedding of the public endorsement key of a TPM in the
proof-of-knowledge which provides the basis for establishing
all security and privacy properties.
Our model can be used for future ECC-DAA formal analysis.
Through the modelling process we gained valuable insights.
The main lesson learned is the approach we applied for repre-
senting the mathematical equations involved in protocol using
TAMARIN’s equational theory. While TAMARIN’s equational
theory does not perform the mathematical operations involved
in the protocol, it does provide a level of abstraction which
maps the mathematical formulae directly to the corresponding
TAMARIN syntax. This allows for our TAMARIN model to be
closer to the implementation detail than previously verified
models. We believe this is a useful modelling style that we and
others will be able to apply in future modelling of complex
protocols.
The TCG, which is an industrial standards body and the
developer of TPM specifications, is continuously working on
improvement of the TPM technology. Since ISO/IEC 20008-2
was published in 2013, several modifications on the ECC-DAA
TPM API in the TPM 2.0 specification have been made and
adopted by ISO/IEC as another international standard, ISO/IEC
11889:2015. These modifications are due to attacks found
against early versions of the ECC-DAA TPM API on TPM 2.0
[43], [44]. Acar et al. in [43] demonstrated that the API for the
TPM allow an adversary to use a TPM as a static Diffie-Hellman
(DH) oracle. Brown and Gallant in [45] found that although
solving a static DH problem is still computationally infeasible
but is simpler to solve than the computational DH problem.
The modifications to the ECC-DAA scheme are as follows:
• Instead of receiving the elliptic curve point J ← H1(bsn),
the TPM receives two values s2, y2, where J = (x2, y2)
and x2 = H(s2) for a hash function H . The computation
of this hash function can avoid that the TPM is used as a
static DH oracle.
• The operation of receiving the elliptic curve point B and
computing the point D by the TPM is removed for the
same reason of avoiding to make the TPM as a static DH
oracle. The replacement is that the Issuer computes the
D value and provides a Schnorr signature, σ, to prove
that the computation is correct. As a result, the DAA
credential is (A,B,C,D, σ) instead of (A,B,C).
With these modifications, the ECC-DAA implementation in the
current version of the TPM 2.0 specification is not compatible
with ISO/IEC 20008-2:2013 mechanism 4. Extending our
models to include these modifications will then provide a
formal analysis of the ISO/IEC 11889:2015 for ECC-DAA
implementations.
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APPENDIX A
The equational theory detailed in Section III-B demonstrates
how the reductions are modelled in TAMARIN. Here we
demonstrate how the equation for the calculation of U ′ is
encoded within TAMARIN:
1 // U’ = [w]P1 - [v]Q2
2 calcU( minus(
3 multp(
4 plus( u, multp(
5 H2( P1 , multp( P1, PRF( DAASeed ,
6 Ki , cnt ) ),
7 U( u, P1 ), pk( isk ),
8 ni ),
9 PRF( DAASeed , Ki, cnt ) ) ),
10 P1 ),
11 multp(
12 H2( P1, multp( P1, PRF( DAASeed , Ki, cnt ) ),
13 U( u, P1 ), pk( isk ), ni ),
14 multp( P1, PRF( DAASeed , Ki, cnt ) ) )
15 ) ) = U( u, P1 ) // U = [u]P1
16
Lines 3 to 10 represents the symbolic form [w]P1 and
embedded within that from lines 4 to 8 is the representation of
u+[v]tsk. The encoding for the equations calcR1 and calcR2
can be seen in our models [24] and follows a similar pattern
to the equation above.
APPENDIX B
The lemmas detailed in Section IV-B addressed functional
correctness and authentication. All the lemmas are available
in our TAMARIN scripts [24]. An example of a TAMARIN
functional correctness lemma is given as follows:
(G1) lemma functional_correctness_group_verification
: exists -trace
"Ex V V1 nv #i #j .
Send( V, nv ) @ i & Confirm( V1, nv ) @ j
& not( V = V1 )"
The weak_agreement lemma is an example of an authentication
lemma:
(G6) lemma weak_agreement:
"All a b n #i .
Commit( a, b, n ) @ i
==> ( Ex n2 #j . Running( b, a, n2 ) @ j )
| ( Ex C #r. IssuerKeyReveal( C ) @ r
& Honest( C ) @ i )
| ( Ex C #r . RevealEK( C ) @ r
& Honest( C ) @ i )
| ( Ex C #r . RevealTsk( C ) @ r
& Honest( C ) @ i )"
The lemma states that whenever a commit action Commit(a,b,n)
occurs at time i, then either this is a conclusion of a valid
protocol run or an agent claimed to be honest at time i has
been compromised at time r. This is the key lemma whose
failure indicates the attack identified in Section V-A.
